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STATUTORY GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT
PHYSICIANS: COGENT POLICY OR A DENIAL OF JUSTICE?
Andrew Flavelle Martin*
Recent events such as the SARS outbreak and the controversy over pediatric forensic
pathology in Ontario have increased awareness and scrutiny of physicians employed by the
government, including medical officers of health, coroners, and pathologists. At common law,
physicians are held to a standard of care that can be summarized as reasonable professional
competence. Statutory provisions effectively neutralize this standard of care for government
physicians by providing civil immunity so long as they act in “good faith”. The appropriateness of this protection from civil liability is assessed in this paper.
The author argues that statutory good-faith immunity is inconsistent with the requirements that these positions be held by licensed doctors; indeed, it is a common provision of
legislation for government employees that is not appropriate to the special case of government
physicians. The Ontario statutory and case law is canvassed in relation to the powers and
duties of coroners, forensic pathologists, and medical officers of health. It is then demonstrated that this statutory good-faith immunity is applied to the vast majority of public actors in
Ontario. Within this context, the historic and current policy rationales for the immunity are
assessed with reference to the recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada and the
Ontario Court of Appeal establishing a tort of negligent investigation by police. The author
then assesses how the common law of tort would apply to government physicians if these
provisions were repealed.
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“To deny a remedy in tort is, quite literally, to deny justice.”
- The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada1

INTRODUCTION
Events of recent years have increased both public awareness and political scrutiny of the
work of physicians performing public functions. In 2003, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) illustrated the importance of public health as a medical discipline.2 In
response to the SARS experience, the federal government commissioned an advisory committee
led by Dr. David Naylor, and the Ontario government appointed a commission under Justice
Archie Campbell, to examine the handling of SARS and make recommendations to strengthen
public health programs and policy.3 Not long after SARS, death investigation—the discipline of
coroners and forensic pathologists—attracted attention. In April 2007, the Office of the Chief
Coroner for Ontario publicly confirmed serious problems with the work of once-renowned pediatric forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Smith.4 The government chose Justice Stephen Goudge of
the Ontario Court of Appeal to lead a public inquiry that would “conduct a systemic review … in
order to make recommendations to restore and enhance public confidence in pediatric forensic
pathology in Ontario and its future use in investigations and criminal proceedings.”5 A span of a
few years had brought public examinations of three different kinds of government physicians:
medical officers of health, coroners, and forensic pathologists.
Despite the merits of these examinations, a major issue remains unaddressed. The three reports were fundamentally concerned with the quality of public health and death investigation,
two areas in which physicians play crucial roles. As a generalization, “[c]ivil liability is widely
used in Canada as a mechanism to ensure quality of health services.”6 However, none of the
1
Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 at
para. 35, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 620, aff‟g (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 481, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 676 (C.A.) [Hill (S.C.C.) cited
to S.C.R.; Hill (C.A.) cited to O.R.].
2
See e.g. Nola M. Ries, “Quarantine and the Law: The 2003 SARS Experience in Canada: A New Disease
Calls on Old Public Health Tools” (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 529; Roxana Salehi & S. Harris Ali, “The Social and
Political Context of Disease Outbreaks: The Case of SARS in Toronto” (2006) 32 Canadian Pub. Pol‟y 373.
3
National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, Learning from SARS: The Renewal of Public Health in Canada (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2003) (Chair: Dr. David Naylor), online: Public Health Agency
of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/sars-sras/pdf/sars-e.pdf> [Naylor Report]; Commission to
Investigate the Introduction and Spread of SARS in Ontario, Final Report (Toronto: Queen‟s Printer for Ontario, 2006) (Commissioner: Justice Archie Campbell), online: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care
<http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/campbell06/online_rep/
index.html> [Campbell Report].
4
Office of the Chief Coroner, Backgrounder: Public Announcement of Review of Criminally Suspicious
and Homicide Cases Where Dr. Charles Smith Conducted Autopsies or Provided Opinions (Toronto: Ministry
of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2007), online: Legislative Library, Legislative Assembly of
Ontario <http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/17000/272655.pdf> [Coroner, “Backgrounder”].
5
Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario, online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General,
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/>; Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology
in Ontario Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008) (Commissioner: the Honourable Stephen T. Goudge), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.
attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/report/index.html> [Goudge Report]; O.C. 826/2007 at 2-3
(Order in Council establishing the Goudge Inquiry), in Goudge Report, vol. 4 at 678-79, online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2007/20070425-pioic-en.pdf>.
6
Tracey Epps, “Regulation of Health Care Professionals” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2007) 69 at 75,
citing M.J. Trebilcock, D. Dewees & D. Duff, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 96.
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three reports questioned in any detail the dramatic extent to which government physicians, specifically medical officers of health, coroners, and forensic pathologists, are protected from civil
liability.7 At common law, the standard of care that applies to doctors is “that degree of care and
skill which could reasonably be expected of a normal, prudent practitioner of the same experience and standing.”8 Legislation effectively lowers this standard by providing civil immunity to
government physicians so long as they act in “good faith”. Thus, doctors with duties and powers
arguably much greater than a typical practitioner are subject to a much lower standard of care.
This reduced liability of government physicians is a critical public policy issue. Ultimately at
stake are the responsibility of government physicians to the public and the responsibility of the
governments that employ them. These go to the fundamental core of public law, the relationship
between the individual and the state. Ideally the state and its servants will not harm the individual. Indeed, the Naylor Report, the SARS Commission, and the Goudge Inquiry focused on how
to prevent or at least reduce that harm. Nonetheless, the question remains: when such harm
does occur, who should bear the cost?
In this paper, I argue that statutory good-faith immunity for government physicians is
fundamentally inconsistent with the expectation of professional competence by licensed doctors.
Instead, it is a relatively standard legislative provision that is not appropriate in the particular
contexts of death investigation and public health. While this issue is not unique to Ontario, that
province will be the primary focus because the SARS and Charles Smith affairs were centred
there.
This argument will proceed in four parts. First, the relevant statutory and case law in Ontario
will be canvassed. I will consider the powers, duties, and good-faith immunity provisions, first of
coroners and forensic pathologists, and then of medical officers of health. I will also survey the
immunities granted to physicians at large corresponding to general duties imposed by statute.
The second part argues that the Ontario immunity provisions for government physicians are
more likely to be an application of standard practice than the result of conscious consideration of
the special context of government physicians. I begin by demonstrating the ubiquity of similar
provisions among Ontario statutes. I then consider the legislative history of the acts governing
coroners, forensic pathologists, and medical officers of health. The third part evaluates the
historical and current policy rationales for good-faith immunity provisions. I explain how parallel jurisprudence from the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing the tort of negligent investigation by police, can be harnessed to reject these rationales. The
fourth part considers how the common law of tort liability would apply to government physicians
in the absence of statutory immunity.

7
The Naylor Report, supra note 3 does not consider this issue. The second interim report of the SARS
Commission considers it very briefly and concludes that the protection should be extended to additional
actors in the public health system: Campbell Report, supra note 3, vol. 5, at 19, 65-66, 69. The issue was also
addressed briefly in a research paper prepared by Professor Lorne Sossin for the Goudge Inquiry, Accountability and Oversight for Death Investigations in Ontario (Toronto: Goudge Inquiry, 2008) at 33-34, online:
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/
goudge/policy_research/pdf/Sossin_Accountability-and-Oversight.pdf>. Professor Sossin‟s analysis will be
discussed below. While Commissioner Goudge recommended several legislative amendments, he did not address the provision that provides immunity from civil liability: Goudge Report, supra note 5, vol. 3 at 288,
309-12, 338-39 (Recommendations 1, 12-14, 17, 38). The issue of good-faith immunity in the context of coroners has recently been raised by at least one journalist: Natalie Alcoba, “Picking up the Pieces: Those Whose
Lives Were Shattered by Charles Smith Have Little Recourse” National Post (12 December 2009) A14.
8
Crits and Crits v. Sylvester et al., [1956] O.R. 132 at 143, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 502 (C.A.) [Crits (C.A.) cited to
O.R.], aff‟d [1956] S.C.R. 991, 5 D.L.R. (2d) 601, quoted in Ellen I. Picard & Gerald B. Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson, 2007) at 225 (as “[t]he classic statement”).
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I
STATUTORY GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR PHYSICIANS
I begin by canvassing the law on statutory immunity for physicians, primarily in Ontario. I
will first consider coroners and forensic pathologists and then medical officers of health. In each
case, I will survey the extensive powers and duties involved as well as the immunity provisions. I
then provide some broader context by examining the major duties imposed by statute on physicians at large and the extent to which corresponding immunity is given.

A. Coroners and Forensic Pathologists
Coroners in Ontario are physicians with substantial duties and powers. A coroner must be a
“legally qualified medical practitione[r],” both upon appointment and in order to keep the position.9 Indeed, the Coroners Act imposes a duty on the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario to inform the Chief Coroner if any coroner ceases to hold a valid medical licence.10
Coroners investigate virtually all unnatural deaths, and deaths in various institutions, in order to
establish “how … when … where … and by what means the deceased came by his or her death.” 11
In order to do so, coroners have broad powers of entry, search, and seizure.12 Obstruction of a
coroner is an offence punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.13 As part of an investigation, a
coroner can commission an autopsy or other tests.14 These tests and investigations can be critical
evidence in criminal prosecutions. Coroners can order inquests “in the public interest,” at which
any evidence or person can be summoned.15
The forensic pathologist performs a discrete complementary role to that of the coroner.
Under the Coroners Act, pathologists are required to be physicians with specializations in
pathology.16 Parallel to the provision concerning coroners, the Act imposes a duty on the College
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario to notify the Chief Forensic Pathologist if a pathologist is
no longer in good standing.17 The pathologist has a duty to perform an autopsy where one is
ordered by a coroner.18 This obligation comes with a broad power of entry, not only of places
where the body is, but also of places from which the pathologist believes (on reasonable and
probable grounds) the body has been removed.19 Moreover, this power can be exercised not only
where a warrant for the autopsy has been issued by the coroner, but also in the absence of a warrant where the pathologist reasonably believes such a warrant will be issued.20

9
Coroners Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.37, s. 3 (The Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 15,
received royal assent on 5 June 2009. And all sections but s. 4 came into force on 27 July, 2009 and s. 4 came
into force on 16 December 2010.). The Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 87 provides that in
Ontario legislation, “legally qualified medical practitioner” and similar terms “mean a member of the College
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario”.
10
Coroners Act, ibid., s. 3(3).
11
Ibid., ss. 10, 15, 31(1).
12
Ibid., s. 16.
13
Ibid., ss. 16(6), 55.
14
Ibid., s. 28.
15
Ibid., ss. 20, 40. See also ss. 22.1, 26, 27, 30-52. As will be discussed further below, the role of a coroner at a coroner‟s inquest is a quasi-judicial function that would not attract liability in negligence at common
law.
16
Ibid., s. 1(1) (This definition of pathologist, like every mention of the term “pathologist” in the Act, was
absent prior to the Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, supra note 9).
17
Ibid., s. 7.1(2).
18
Ibid., s. 28(1), (3).
19
Ibid., s. 28(4).
20
Ibid.
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While these powers of coroners and forensic pathologists are extensive, the corresponding
liability is minimal. Section 53 of the Coroners Act provides as follows:
No action or other proceeding shall be instituted against any person exercising a
power or performing a duty under this Act for any act done in good faith in the execution
or intended execution of any such power or duty or for any alleged neglect or default in the
execution in good faith of any such power or duty.21

It is critically important to note that section 53 does more than provide good-faith immunity to
the coroner or forensic pathologist. It also ensures that the Crown is immune from vicarious
liability for the acts of that person on its behalf, again so long as good faith cannot be disproved. This result occurs because of the interaction of section 53 of the Coroners Act with the
Proceedings Against the Crown Act.22 Section 5 of PACA makes the Crown vicariously liable in
tort for its agents and servants; however, it also precludes Crown liability where those servants
and agents are not personally liable.23 Thus, section 53 precludes recovery not only from the
coroner or forensic pathologist, but also from the Crown. This immunity has two key features:
it requires only good faith, and it applies to a power or duty under the Act.24
The Coroners Act illustrates the potential uncertainty over the scope of good-faith immunity.
“Good faith” has been recognized as a term that must be interpreted in its specific context. 25 In
general, “[i]f there is one word that delineates or characterizes the expression „good faith‟, it is
„honesty‟.”26 In granting summary judgment against a claim asserting bad faith of a pathologist
acting under the Coroners Act, Justice MacKinnon adopted the following definition of good faith
from Black’s Law Dictionary:
a state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one‟s duty
or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given
trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.27

Good faith thus involves honesty or absence of malicious intent. However, a unanimous 2004
decision of the Supreme Court broadened the circumstances in which an absence of good faith
can be inferred:
[T]he concept of bad faith can and must be given a broader meaning that encompasses
serious carelessness or recklessness. Bad faith certainly includes intentional fault ... Such
conduct is an abuse of power for which the State, or sometimes a public servant, may be
held liable. However, recklessness implies a fundamental breakdown of the orderly exer21
Ibid. [emphasis added] (Prior to the Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, supra note 9, s. 53 read as follows: “No action or other proceeding for damages lies or shall be instituted against a coroner or any person
acting under the coroner’s authority for an act done by him or her in good faith in the performance or intended performance of any power or duty under this Act or the regulations, or for any neglect or default in
the performance in good faith of any such power or duty” [emphasis added].).
22
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27 [PACA].
23
Ibid. This is a codification of common law: see Peter W. Hogg & Patrick Monahan, Liability of the
Crown, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 120 (citing cases from the U.K. and Australia: “Unless such a
clause expressly preserves the vicarious liability of the Crown, the clause will also immunize the Crown from
liability”); see also Karen Horsman & Gareth Morley, eds., Government Liability Law and Practice, looseleaf
(Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2009) at 5.50.10.
24
Sossin, supra note 7 at 33; see also Horsman & Morley, ibid. at 5.50.
25
McAlpine v. H.(T.) (1991), 57 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 at para. 35, 82 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 7 C.C.L.T. (2d) 113
(C.A.); R. v. Devereaux (1996), 147 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 108, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 243 at 254 (Nfld. C.A.) [Devereaux
cited to C.C.C.].
26
Devereaux, ibid. at 255.
27
Burns v. Johnston, [2003] O.T.C. 290, [2003] O.J. No. 1452 at para. 26 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Burns I]
quoting Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (Minnesota: West, 1990) at 701, action via
amended statement of claim dismissed, [2003] O.T.C. 549 (Sup. Ct. J.) [Burns II].
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cise of authority to the point that absence of good faith can be deduced and bad faith
presumed. The act, in terms of how it is performed, is then inexplicable and incomprehensible to the point that it can be regarded as an actual abuse of power, having regard to the
purposes for which it is meant to be exercised.28

The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently addressed the relationship between the wrongness of
a decision and bad faith: “[w]hile a wrong decision, even a very wrong decision cannot be
equated to a decision made in bad faith, a decision may be so clearly wrong on the merits as to
provide some evidentiary support for a finding of bad faith.”29 Thus good faith is also negated
by “recklessness” or “serious carelessness”, even in the absence of demonstrable malice, and
can be questioned where a decision is “clearly wrong”.
However, a second element must also be met to obtain good-faith immunity: that the
conduct at issue was in the exercise of a power or duty under the Act. This element of section 53
has arisen in the context of forensic pathologists. In Burns v. Johnston, at issue was whether a
pathologist was liable in negligence for providing an oral opinion of cause of death to the police
before receiving toxicology results. 30 The plaintiff was charged with murder based on that opinion, and the charge was withdrawn when the pathologist later changed the cause of death to drug
overdose.31 At that time, section 28(2) of the Coroners Act required the autopsy report to be
made “in writing only to the coroner who issued the warrant, the Crown Attorney, the regional
coroner and the Chief Coroner.”32 Nonetheless, Justice Manton found that such communication
between coroners and police was common practice, reasonable, and “necessary if feasible”, and
thus covered by section 53.33 The Ontario Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion in
Reynolds v. Kingston (City) Police Services Board.34 A murder charge based on a pathologist‟s
oral report to police was withdrawn after a second autopsy.35 Without mentioning the decision in
Burns, the Court of Appeal characterized the provision of an oral opinion to police as “[c]ontrary
to s. 28(2) of the [Coroners] Act.”36
Finney v. Barreau du Québec, 2004 SCC 36, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17 at para. 39, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 410 [citations omitted; emphasis added]. An extended version of this passage is quoted in Horsman & Morley, supra
note 23 at 5.50.20.
29
Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional Hospital, 2010 ONCA 13, 257 O.A.C. 283 [Rosenhek], leave to appeal
refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 89, aff‟g [2007] O.J. No. 4486 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).
30
Supra note 27. Note that this case occurred before the class of persons covered by s. 53 was extended
by the Coroners Amendment Act, supra note 9. However, the change in language does not go to the issues in
the case. See the previous version of s. 53, supra note 21. For a discussion of s. 53 in the context of the relationship between the coroner and the police, see Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Beyond the Goudge Inquiry: Is the
Coroner Part of „The Crown‟ for Stinchcombe Disclosure Obligations?” (2009) 67 U.T. Fac. L. Rev 9 at 31-32.
31
Burns II, ibid. at paras. 4, 27.
32
Coroners Act, supra note 9, quoted in Burns II, ibid. at para. 29. Note that this part of s. 28 is no
longer in force after the Coroners Amendment Act, supra note 9. The current s. 29(1) governing the reporting
of results by the pathologist omits the word “only”: “The pathologist who performed the post mortem examination of a body under section 28 shall forthwith report in writing his or her findings from the post mortem
examination and from any other examinations or analyses that he or she conducted to the coroner who issued
the warrant, the regional coroner and, if the pathologist who performed the post mortem examination is not
the Chief Forensic Pathologist, the Chief Forensic Pathologist.” It is unclear how this non-exclusive list of persons to whom the report is to be made will affect the recurrence of a challenge parallel to that in Burns. The
phrase “in writing” may still be interpreted to preclude oral reporting.
33
Burns II, ibid. at paras. 30-35.
34
2007 ONCA 166, 84 O.R. (3d) 738, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 311 [Reynolds cited to O.R.].
35
Ibid. at paras. 1-6.
36
Ibid. at para. 1, referring to the Coroners Act, supra note 9. Note that the pathologist sought to strike
the statement of claim by asserting the common-law doctrine of witness immunity. The Court found that witness immunity did not necessarily apply to the pathologist‟s death-investigation functions before his testimony, and the issue would need to be resolved at trial. However, witness immunity is not statutory and so is
outside the focus of this paper.
28
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The matter is further complicated by the research program and policy roundtables of the
Goudge Inquiry. In his report, Professor Sossin stated that “[t]he third stage of the death investigation consists of the pathologist communicating the results of the autopsy to the coroner (and,
where appropriate, to the police).”37 He did not elaborate on the meaning of “where appropriate”.
Mark Sandler, Special Counsel, Criminal Law, framed a panel discussion of the issue as though
the oral reporting of the tentative findings to the police was accepted as appropriate, and only its
content and documentation were in issue:
[A]t the end of the autopsy, the forensic pathologist completes his or her examination and
then speaks to the police officers. And the question arises: What should the forensic pathologist be saying to the police at that stage and whether what they‟re saying to the police
should be captured in writing.38

While there was consensus around the importance of making a record of these communications to allow their disclosure to the defense, the oral reporting itself had wide support from
the police and Crown Attorney panelists.39 Indeed, Commissioner Goudge wrote that the provision of a preliminary opinion was not “necessarily wrong” and could be useful, although a
written record of the opinion should be kept.40
This disagreement over the precise breadth of section 53 of the Coroners Act, specifically
whether an oral report by the pathologist is allowed, or expected, or mandated, demonstrates a
critical aspect of statutory immunity for government physicians.41 It also reveals a larger underlying issue. Even if the particular action taken by a government physician is in the performance of
a power or duty under the relevant legislation, should he or she escape civil liability for taking
that action negligently? Ultimately, it is preferable for that determination to result not from an
exercise in statutory interpretation as in Burns, but instead from a normative policy choice.
Some, but not all, of the regimes governing death investigation in other Canadian jurisdictions have provisions parallel to section 53. In the four provinces with medical examiner
systems,42 where medical examiners must be physicians and the chief medical examiner must be
a pathologist, there are no good-faith immunity provisions.43 Other than Ontario, P.E.I. is the
only jurisdiction in which coroners must be physicians,44 and those coroners also enjoy goodfaith immunity.45 Of the remaining coroner jurisdictions, New Brunswick and the Yukon provide
no immunity, 46 Saskatchewan, B.C. and Quebec provide good-faith immunity, 47 and in the
Sossin, supra note 7 at 14.
Goudge Inquiry, Transcripts: Roundtables (12 Feb. 2008) at 192, online: IIS7 <http://mail.
tscript.com/trans/pfp/feb_12_08/index.htm>.
39
Ibid. at 205-06, 262-64.
40
Goudge Report, supra note 5, vol. 2 at 174-75.
41
Sossin, supra note 7 at 34 (uncertainty around the scope of s. 53 contributes to corresponding uncertainty in “the extent to which civil suits may provide an effective forum for accountability and oversight”).
42
Under the traditional coroner system, developed in England and imported to Upper Canada prior to
confederation, coroners were not doctors. In contrast, a defining feature of the medical examiner system of
death investigation—which originated in the U.S. in the 20th century—was the requirement that medical
examiners be doctors, usually pathologists. See Randy Hanzlick, Options for Modernizing the Ontario Coroner’s System (Toronto: Goudge Inquiry, 2008) at 5, 16-17, 37-38, online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/policy_research/pdf/Hanzlick_Optionsfor-Modernizing.pdf>.
43
Fatality Investigations Act, S.N.S. 2001, c. 31, ss. 3-4; Fatality Inquiries Act, C.C.S.M. c. F52, ss. 1- 2;
Fatality Inquiries Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-9, ss. 5, 7; Fatalities Investigations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. F-6.1, ss. 2-4.
To be precise, Manitoba provides statutory immunity to the Chief Medical Examiner with regard to the disposal of inquest exhibits, and the provision does not require good faith: Fatality Inquiries Act, C.C.S.M. c.
F52, s. 33.
44
Coroners Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-25.1, ss. 3-4.
45
Ibid., s. 53.
46
Coroners Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-23; Coroners Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 44.
37

38
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Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, the immunity applies unless the coroner “acted in bad faith
or without reasonable and probable cause.”48

B. Medical Officers of Health
A medical officer of health (“MOH”) or an associate medical officer of health must be a physician, where physician is defined as “a legally qualified medical practitioner,” with a community
medicine fellowship or other academic training in public health.49 Furthermore, the Chief Medical Officer of Health (“CMOH”) and Associate Chief Medical Officer of Health are each required
to have been a physician for at least five years.50 In addition to these qualifications, every MOH
has a duty to “keep himself or herself informed in respect of matters related to occupational and
environmental health.”51 Thus, the qualifications required of an MOH are more extensive than
those of a coroner.
The significant powers and duties of MOHs reflect these qualifications. MOHs have a duty to
inspect or order inspection of their territory, including places used for food storage or service or
as boarding houses, and have broad powers of entry to do so.52 Obstruction of such an investigation is an offence.53 Where there is a health hazard, the MOH can require remedial measures.54
The MOH has the power to seize and destroy “any substance, thing, plant or animal other than
man” constituting a hazard.55 The MOH also has extensive powers to quarantine individuals or
classes of individuals, as well as the power to compel their examination or treatment without
consent.56 If such an order for quarantine, examination, or treatment is not followed, a judge can
order that person detained for that purpose with the assistance of the police.57 The CMOH has
significant additional powers to those of the MOHs. If the CMOH certifies “an immediate risk”,
the Minister can declare any premises a quarantine facility and order any medical supplies
seized.58 Similarly, the CMOH can require the release of any health records necessary if there is
“an immediate and serious risk.”59 In case of “an immediate risk”, the CMOH can issue a mandatory directive “respecting precautions and procedures” to any health professional or facility.60
Subsection 95(1) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act (“HPPA”) provides, similarly
to section 53 of the Coroners Act, as follows:
No action or other proceeding for damages or otherwise shall be instituted against
the Chief Medical Officer of Health or the Associate Chief Medical Officer of Health, a
member of a board of health, a medical officer of health, an associate medical officer of
health of a board of health, an acting medical officer of health of a board of health or a public health inspector or an employee of a board of health who is working under the direction
of a medical officer of health for any act done in good faith in the execution or the intended
47
Coroners Act, 1999, S.S. 1999, c. C-38.01, s. 59; An Act respecting the determination of the causes and
circumstances of death, R.S.Q. 1983 c. R-0.2, s. 16; Coroners Act, S.B.C. 2007, c. 15, s. 62(2).
48
Coroners Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-20, s. 60.
49
Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7, as am. by S.O. 2007, c. 10, ss. 1, 64 [HPPA];
Qualifications of Boards of Health Staff, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 566, s. 1.
50
HPPA, ibid., ss. 81(2), 81.1(3).
51
Ibid., ss. 12(1), 81(3).
52
Ibid., ss. 10, 41, 43.
53
Ibid., ss. 42, 100-101.
54
Ibid., s. 13.
55
Ibid., s. 19.
56
Ibid., s. 22.
57
Ibid., ss. 35, 36.
58
Ibid., ss. 77.4, 77.5.
59
Ibid., s. 77.6.
60
Ibid., s. 77.7.
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execution of any duty or power under this Act or for any alleged neglect or default in the
execution in good faith of any such duty or power.61

However, unlike the Coroners Act, the section proceeds to preserve the liability of the Crown
notwithstanding PACA.62 Similarly, boards of health remain liable.63 Section 95(1) has been
applied to protect MOHs from liability regarding an alleged failure to address pollution from a
metal refinery 64 and inspections of a lodging house for the elderly. 65 However, these
applications of the immunity are very straightforward and provide little material for analysis.
In particular, none of the SARS cases have involved section 95 immunity.66
Statutory good-faith immunity in the public health context applies in most Canadian jurisdictions. The crown and individuals are explicitly immune in Alberta, Quebec, and Saskatchewan;67 individuals are immune, and thus the Crown immune, in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and

61
Ibid., s. 95(1) [emphasis added]. Note that prior to the 2007 amendment, which followed a recommendation by the Campbell Commission to extend the coverage of this immunity to all public health actors
(Campbell Report, supra note 3), s. 95 only covered “a member of a board of health, a medical officer of
health, an associate medical officer of health of a board of health, an acting medical officer of health of a board
of health or a public health inspector”.
62
Ibid., s. 95(1.1); PACA, supra note 22.
63
Ibid., s. 95(3). Note that prior to the 2007 amendments, the individuals protected by s. 95(1) were
most often employees of boards of health and not the provincial government, so Crown liability was not at
issue—s. 95(3) preserved vicarious liability. The addition of subsection 95(1.1) was necessary to extend the
preservation of vicarious liability for the new Crown agents, such as the CMOH, added to s. 95(1). Note also
that protection for MOHs equivalent to s. 95(1) and (3) under the HPPA is found in s. 9(1) and (3) of the
Mandatory Blood Testing Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 26. However, the MOH has no decision-making role in the
process other than determining that the application for testing “meets the requirements of the regulations” (s.
3). Due to the lack of a substantive role for the MOH under the Act, and the absence of case law, these provisions will not be discussed further.
64
Pearson v. Inco Ltd., [2002] O.T.C. 515, 33 C.P.C. (5th) 264 at paras. 88-92 (Sup. Ct. J.), aff‟d (2004),
183 O.A.C. 168, 44 C.P.C. (5th) 276 (Div. Ct.), rev‟d on other grounds (2006), 78 O.R. (3d) 641, 261 D.L.R.
(4th) 629 (C.A.) (this case was a proposed class action involving the health effects of pollution emitted by the
refinery, and the MOH was alleged to have failed in her duties to inspect, investigate, and eliminate the relevant health hazards).
65
St. Elizabeth Home Society v. Hamilton (City), [2005] O.T.C. 1074, [2005] O.J. No. 5369 at para. 95
(Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) (this was a complex case in which the Society claimed, among other things, that the MOH
and the city‟s public health department were negligent in their investigations of complaints about the level of
care at the home and in their enforcement of the relevant by-laws).
66
The SARS cases generally do not involve claims against MOHs, so s. 95 immunity is not at issue: Jamal
Estate v. Scarborough Hospital - Grace Division (2005), 34 C.C.L.T. (3d) 271, [2005] O.J. No. 3506 (Sup. Ct.
J.) (QL), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 376, 95 O.R. (3d) 760, 66 C.C.L.T. (3d) 188, leave to appeal refused, [2009]
S.C.C.A. No. 30 [Jamal Estate]; Henry Estate (Trustee of) v. Scarborough Hospital (2005), 34 C.C.L.T. (3d)
278, [2005] O.J. No. 3505 (S.C.J.) (QL), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 375, 66 C.C.L.T. (3d) 184, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 306 [Henry Estate]; Laroza Estate v. Ontario (2005), 257 D.L.R. (4th) 761, 34
C.C.L.T. (3d) 264 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 373, 95 O.R. (3d) 764, 251 O.A.C. 119 [Laroza Estate];
Abarquez v. Ontario (2005), 257 D.L.R. (4th) 745, 34 C.C.L.T. (3d) 249 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), rev‟d 2009 ONCA
374, 95 O.R. (3d) 414, 252 O.A.C. 267, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 297 [Abarquez]; see also
Williams v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 763 at para. 102 (Sup. Ct. J.), rev‟d on other
grounds, 2009 ONCA 378, 95 O.R. (3d) 401, 249 O.A.C. 150, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 298
(at trial Cullity J. noted that “no duties of care or acts of negligence are pleaded against the City‟s Medical Officer of Health”) [Williams]. For a discussion of the private law duties of care owed by public health authorities and government, see Bernard M. Dickens, “Legal and Ethical Obligations of Public Health Authorities and
Government” in Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing, “Looking Forward…” Policy Papers,
vol. 2 (St. John‟s: Newfoundland and Labrador, 2009) at 11-19, online: CIHRT <http://www.
cihrt.nl.ca/Final%20Report/index.pdf> [Dickens, “Legal and Ethical Obligations”].
67
Public Health Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-37, s. 66.1 as am. by S.A. 2002, c. 32, s. 12(12); Public Health Act,
R.S.Q. c. S-2.2, s. 123; The Public Health Act, 1994, S.S. 1994, c. P-37.1, s. 68(1).
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P.E.I.;68 individuals are immune but the Crown is not immune in B.C. and New Brunswick.69 The
relevant statute is silent on immunity only in Newfoundland and two of the three territories; the
recent Public Health Act, 2007 of the Northwest Territories provides individual immunity, but is
silent on Crown liability.70 Other than the respective provisions regarding the Crown, the only
variations of any import are that the P.E.I. provision and one of the two B.C. provisions refer to
bad faith instead of good faith, and the Quebec provision applies only during a “public health
emergency.”71

C. Other Physicians Exercising Statutory Powers & Duties
It should be noted that similar statutory provisions protect physicians at large in their
exercise of duties mandated by statute. For example, the HPPA creates a duty on doctors (and
various other health professionals) to report to the MOH if any person they treat “has or may
have a reportable disease.”72 Section 95(4) provides corresponding good-faith immunity for the
reporting professional.73 The effective scope of that section is limited, however, as described in
the recent case of Healey v. Lakeridge Health Corp.:
I do not find in these provisions, or in the scheme of HPPA as a whole, any implication of a
legislative intention to relieve physicians and hospitals of liability for negligence in the
event that, through a want of reasonable care, they fail to diagnose and report a case of TB
in a timely manner.74

The Mandatory Gunshot Wounds Reporting Act creates a similar duty to report to the police
any patient that is treated for a gunshot wound, and provides corresponding good-faith
immunity. 75 Statutory good-faith immunity is also extended to the College of Physicians and
Surgeons (and other Colleges), its Council and committees and panels, and the individuals
acting under their authority, by the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.76 Thus, doctors
involved in registration, complaints, discipline, incapacity, and reinstatements are protected.77
68
The Public Health Act, C.C.S.M. c. P210, s. 106(1); Proceedings Against the Crown Act, C.C.S.M. c.
P140, s. 4; Health Protection Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 4, s. 12; Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1989,
c. 360, s. 5; Public Health Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-30, s. 22.3 as am. by S.P.E.I. 2006, c. 17, s. 3; Crown Proceedings Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-32, s. 4.
69
Public Health Act, S.B.C. 2008, ss. 28, 92; Public Health Act, S.N.B. 1998, c. P-22.4, s. 64.
70
Health and Community Services Act, S.N. 1995, c. P-37.1; Public Health and Safety Act, R.S.Y. 2002,
c. 176; Public Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. P-12 (Nu); Public Health Act, S.N.W.T. 2007, c. 17, s. 41.
71
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-30, s. 22.3; Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 179, s. 34.1; Public Health Act, R.S.Q. c.
S-2.2, s. 123.
72
Supra note 49, ss. 25, 26.
73
HPPA, ibid.
74
(2006), 38 C.P.C. (6th) 145 at paras. 62-63, [2006] O.J. No. 4277 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), Cullity J. [Lakeridge Health]. Note that Perell J. has recently granted in the same proceedings a partial motion for summary
judgment against those persons who were informed of exposure to TB but were not infected: Healey v.
Lakeridge Health Corp., 2010 ONSC 725 at para. 13, 72 C.C.L.T. (3d) 261 (Sup. Ct. J.) (Perell J. held that the
hospital had no duty of care to those persons, that there is no compensation available in law for psychological
injury short of recognizable psychiatric illness, and that such damages would fail for remoteness).
75
S.O. 2005, c. 9, ss. 2, 4.
76
S.O. 1991, c.18, s. 38.
77
Health Professions Procedural Code, being Sched. 2 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991,
ibid. (and by virtue of s. 4 of that Act, deemed part of the Medicine Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 30); see e.g. Deep v.
Massel, [2007] O.J. No. 2811 at paras. 17-23 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), aff‟d 2008 ONCA 4, [2008] O.J. No. 18 (QL).
Immunity for other administrative and quasi-administrative functions that may be performed by doctors or
others, beyond the scope of this paper, are found in the Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
H.20, s. 9, the Independent Health Facilities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.3, s. 38, and the Public Hospitals Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, s. 13. For a discussion of bad faith in the context of a hospital board under the Public
Hospitals Act, see Rosenhek, supra note 29 at paras. 26-35.
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Two subtle variations on these schemes of statutory good-faith immunity are “reasonable
grounds” and “gross negligence”. The Health Care Consent Act provides civil immunity to physicians for treatment in the absence of consent, where there is not only a good-faith belief in
consent but also reasonable grounds for that belief.78 A similar requirement for immunity is
found in the Child and Family Services Act, which imposes on physicians, among others, a duty
to report child abuse or neglect.79 It provides good-faith immunity unless the reporting physician
“acts … without reasonable grounds for the suspicion.”80 The “gross negligence” variation of
good-faith immunity is demonstrated by the Good Samaritan Act, 2001 and the Chase
McEachern Act (Heart Defibrillator Civil Liability), 2007.81 These acts provide civil immunity to
health professionals giving “emergency health care services or first aid” or using an automated
defibrillator outside a hospital or equivalent facility in good faith, but only in the absence of
“gross negligence”.82 These “reasonable grounds” and “gross negligence” variations demonstrate
that the government is willing to require more than good faith for immunity when it imposes
obligations on physicians at large.

II
GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY AS A STANDARD LEGISLATIVE PROVISION
Far from being a unique feature of the health care field or the medical profession, good-faith
immunity is a standard provision across many legislative regimes in Ontario. As between coroners and MOHs, some regimes cover the actor and the Crown while others protect only against
personal liability; however, the latter scheme is much more common. For example, the vast
majority of Ontario government ministries have personal, but not Crown, immunity.83 Equivalent statutory schemes cover many other actors exercising important public functions, including:
the Building Code and Building Materials Evaluation Commissions, building code officials and
inspectors;84 firefighters, the Fire Marshal, and the Fire Safety Commission;85 the diagnostic and
Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, s. 29(1).
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 72(1)-(3), (5)(a) [CFSA].
80
Ibid., s. 72(7) (The requirement of good faith is expressed as an absence of malice.).
81
Good Samaritan Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 2 [Good Samaritan Act]; Chase McEachern Act (Heart Defibrillator Civil Liability), 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 10, Sch. N [Chase McEachern Act].
82
Good Samaritan Act, ibid., ss. 1-2; Chase McEachern Act, ibid., s. 2. Section 2 of both Acts also requires the action to be “voluntarily and without reasonable expectation of compensation or reward”.
83
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.16, s. 6; Ministry of Citizenship
and Culture Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.18, s. 8; Ministry of Community and Social Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
M.20, s. 4; Ministry of Consumer and Business Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.21, s. 8; Ministry of Correctional Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.22, s. 12 (liability is also precluded “for any act of an inmate, parolee,
probationer or young person while under his or her custody and supervision”); Ministry of Economic Development and Trade Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.27, s. 10; Ministry of Energy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.23, s. 5; Ministry of Government Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.25, s. 15 (also covers the Queen‟s Printer for Ontario);
Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.28, s. 7; Ministry of Labour Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
M.29, s. 4.1, as am. by S.O. 2006, c. 19, Sched. M, s. 4; Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. M.30, s. 7; Ministry of Natural Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.31, s. 5; Ministry of Northern
Development and Mines Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.32, s. 5; Ministry of Revenue Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.33, s. 8;
Ministry of Tourism and Recreation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.35, s. 9; Ministry of Transportation Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. M.36, s. 9, as am. by S.O. 2006, c. 19, Sched. T, s. 9; Ministry of Treasury and Economics Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. M.37, s. 7. Notable examples of Ministry acts that do not provide good-faith immunity include the
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.26; Ministry of the Solicitor General Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. M.34; Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17 (the Crown Attorneys Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.49, s. 14.3(3) provides personal immunity in matters of property relating to criminal
offences); see also Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 120, n. 56 (the numerical results of a similar survey of
Ontario ministries conducted as of 2000).
84
Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23, s. 31.
85
Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 4, s. 74.
78
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therapeutic X-ray safety Director and inspectors;86 and the Director of the Family Responsibility
Office.87 Examples of actors immunized under regimes that do not provide for Crown liability are
the Ontario Health Quality Council 88 and Directors appointed under the Accessibility for
Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005.89 Furthermore, the immunity provided to the College of
Physicians and Surgeons under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 is equivalent to that
granted to the Law Society of Upper Canada.90 The ubiquity of these provisions suggests that
they may be accepted as standard legislative features.
The legislative origins of the immunity provisions in the Coroners Act and the HPPA demonstrate that they were not the subject of public debate, which suggests an absence of conscious
policy consideration by legislators. The current section 53 of the Coroners Act was originally introduced in 1978 in The Coroners Amendment Act, 1978 (No. 1.).91 There is no mention of this
provision in the legislative record.92 On first reading, the Solicitor General described The Coroners Amendment Act as “basically housekeeping amendments required to update the act.
There‟s no change in the principle of the bill but the amendments will help to clarify some provisions in the Coroners Act and assist the operation of the coroners office in certain areas.”93 More
recently, the Coroners Amendment Act, 2009 amended section 53 to provide good-faith immunity to all persons acting under the Act, not only coroners and their designates.94 However, the
legislative history contains no discussion, much less mention, of extending that protection, nor
of whether good-faith immunity is appropriate for physicians.95 Interestingly, this is despite the
emphasis on accountability expressed by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional
Services on second reading: “The proposed legislation … would … establish the framework
needed to hold pathologists fully accountable for their work.”96 Also missing in the legislative
history is any consideration of adding a clause that would maintain Crown liability notwithstanding PACA. The legislative history of section 95 of the HPPA is similar. That provision was
originally introduced in the Health Protection and Promotion Act, 1983,97 but it was not mentioned in any of the corresponding legislative debates.98 Insofar as parliamentary debates dem86
87
88
89
90
91

Healing Arts Radiation Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.2, s. 26.
Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, S.O. 1996, c. 31, s. 59.
Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 5, s. 3.
S.O. 2005, c. 11, s. 30.
S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 38. Cf. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 9.
S.O. 1978, c. 38, s. 17 [The Coroners Amendment Act], adding s. 44a to The Coroners Act, S.O. 1972 c.

98.
First reading: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 59 (11 May
1978) at 2394. Second reading: No. 67 (23 May 1978) at 2729-33; No. 68 (23 May 1978) at 2739-55. Committee of the Whole: No. 79 (6 June 1978) at 3176-93; No. 90 (19 June 1978) at 3620-25. Third reading: No. 90
(19 June 1978) at 3638.
93
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 59 (11 May 1978) at 2394
(Hon. George Albert Kerr).
94
Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, supra note 9, s. 27, amending s. 53 of the Coroners Act, supra note
9.
95
Ministerial statement & first reading: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 79 (23 October 2008) at 3537-38, 3539-40. Second reading: No. 97 (2 December 2008) at 436978; No. 98 (3 December 2008) at 4407-14; No. 101 (9 December 2008) at 4569-71. Standing Committee on
Justice Policy: JP-12 (12 March 2009) at JP-261 - JP-281; JP-13 (26 March 2009) at JP-283 - JP-294; JP-14
(2 April 2009) at JP-295 - JP-320; JP-15 (9 April 2009) at JP-321 - JP-338. Bill reported as amended: No.
136 (20 April 2009) at 6085-86. Third reading: No. 155 (28 May 2009) at 7017-26.
96
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 97 (2 December 2008) at
4370 (Hon. Rick Bartolucci) [emphasis added].
97
S.O. 1983, c. 10, s. 94.
98
Ministerial statement & first reading: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 68 (8 June 1982) at 2435-36, 2452. Second reading: No. 93 (29 June 1982) at 3329-45, 3349-50.
Committee of the whole: No. 211 (13 February 1983) at 7599-607. Third reading: No. 211 (13 February 1983)
at 7607-09.
92
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onstrate legislative purpose and intention, it is noteworthy that the addition of these provisions
for government physicians was not mentioned once in the legislature.
In combination, the ubiquity of good-faith immunity provisions in Ontario legislation and
the absence of any consideration of the appropriateness of such provisions in the relevant legislative record of both the Coroners Act and the HPPA suggest that the relevant sections of those
Acts may be the result of a standard drafting approach, and not of a consideration of the particular context of government physicians.

III
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY
In this part, I evaluate the role of statutory good-faith immunity. I begin by assessing the
historic and current basis for its use. I then turn to the arguments against such use, drawing on
analyses by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill.

A. Historic and Current Policy Rationales for Good-Faith Immunity
While Ontario is a useful case study of statutory good-faith immunity, it is not unique or even
unusual. As Professors Hogg and Monahan have observed, “[m]any statutes contain immunity
clauses that relieve Crown servants for liability in tort for acts done in good faith in the intended
execution of their duties.”99 Here I canvass the rationales for this policy.
Personal liability was historically considered necessary because the Crown was immune, and
so otherwise the victim would not be able to collect damages.100 Thus, modern Crown liability
makes personal liability unnecessary.101 The specific rationale for Crown liability is “loss shifting
or spreading … among those who benefit from its services: the taxpayers.”102 However, due to
PACA the default effect of providing the public actor with immunity is to provide that same
immunity to the Crown. Professors Hogg and Monahan describe this as “indefensible as a matter
of policy, because it leaves the innocent victim without redress.”103 Indeed, they suggest that even
where the scope of the immunity is framed as one of statutory interpretation, judges may engage
normative policy considerations by “giv[ing] the immunity clause an artificially narrow interpretation.”104 As noted above, the HPPA immunity regime for MOHs is different from that of the
Coroners Act, as under the former the government remains liable for the acts of the immune
physician. On this basis, the statutory immunity provided by the Coroners Act is problematic
from an equity perspective—the person harmed by the negligence of an MOH has recourse
against the government, but the one harmed by a coroner or forensic pathologist does not.
The more enduring reasoning behind immunity for public actors is that liability may have a
net negative effect on the performance of their duties:
[A]n effective public administration is best achieved when public officials who are given
discretionary functions to perform, are free from intimidation of litigation and damages for
the exercise of that function…. [I]t is better to risk misperformance, albeit in good faith, due
99
Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 120; see also Horsman & Morley, supra note 23 at 5.50 (who refer
to “a myriad of provincial statutes”).
100
Kurt J.W. Sandstrom, “Personal and Vicarious Liability for the Wrongful Acts of Government Officials:
An Approach for Liability Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1990) 24 U.B.C. L. Rev. 229 at 262;
see also Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 117.
101
Ibid.
102
Sandstrom, ibid. at 261-62.
103
Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 120.
104
Ibid., citing e.g. Beatty v. Kozak, [1958] S.C.R. 177. Any such covert normative analysis is not apparent
in Burns, supra note 27, or Reynolds, supra note 34.
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to no threat of civil responsibility for the misperformance, than to take no action at all
based on a fear of such responsibility.105

Note that this concern is also reflected in the common law. For example, in its recent decision
on malicious prosecution, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of deference to
prosecutorial discretion:
[P]rosecutors are vested with extensive discretion and decision-making authority to carry
out their functions. Given the importance of this role to the administration of justice, courts
should be very slow indeed to second-guess a prosecutor‟s judgment calls when assessing
Crown liability for prosecutorial misconduct. Nelles affirmed unequivocally the public
interest in setting the threshold for such liability very high, so as to deter all but the most
serious claims against the prosecuting authorities, and to ensure that Crown liability is
engaged in only the most exceptional circumstances.106

This inaction due to the fear of litigation is often termed a “chilling effect”.107 Recall that the
protection under section 95 of the HPPA was extended to a broader class of public servants in
2007, following the recommendation of the SARS Commission.108 It was once called “naïve” to
consider civil liability necessary to prevent “malicious or negligent acts”; instead, “deterrence
should be deferred to the particular institution.” 109 Indeed, Professors Hogg and Monahan
identify the idea “that the government‟s internal disciplinary procedures would be effectively
employed against incompetent or over-zealous public servants” as an assumption inherent to
the assertion that civil liability of the individual “is an unpredictable and usually disproportionately severe penalty.”110
The adverse impact of tort liability on job performance, including the chilling effect, is often
cited as a concern for physicians at large as well as medical professionals more generally. The
potential for liability may influence a physician to do things he would not otherwise do, such as
run unnecessary tests—“positive defensive medicine”—or not to do things he would normally do,
such as perform a procedure that commonly attracts malpractice litigation—“negative defensive
medicine”.111 The latter is a specific application of the chilling effect. The most extreme manifestation of defensive medicine, just as any other chilling effect, is to discontinue a job or not to take
it in the first place. This would include a practicing physician changing specialities or retiring
from the profession, or a new physician choosing against certain specialties.112 In his report,
Liability and Compensation in Health Care, Dean Prichard made the following finding regarding defensive medicine:
We find some support for the allegation that civil liability claims induce “defensive medicine” but that most of the allegations are exaggerated ... [C]ivil liability claims have caused
some physicians to take some undue precautions in some circumstances and in some cases

Sandstrom, supra note 100 at 259. See also 263-64.
Miazga v. Kwello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339 at para. 50 [Miazga], quoting from Proulx
v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9 at para. 4 [Proulx emphasis in Miazga], referring to Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 [Nelles].
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incompetence by pediatric forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Smith: Coroner, “Backgrounder”, supra note 4.
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to restrict unduly the scope of their practices but … factors other than civil liability also
contribute substantially to those decisions.113

Commissioner Goudge specifically discussed the difficulty in attracting physicians to practice
forensic pathology. 114 In addition to “heavy workloads” and “poor remuneration”, he cited
“severe public scrutiny.” 115 He recommended better funding for training and fellowships,
opportunities for career advancement, reduced workloads to allow for research and teaching,
more consistent compensation, more full-time positions, and “state of the art” facilities and
equipment.116 Notably, he never suggested that scrutiny was unwarranted or standards should
be lowered; instead, the solution was to address the other factors making the profession unattractive. This is a good example to follow for government physicians in general—if indeed the
removal of good-faith liability promotes a chilling effect, it can be offset by other means.
It should be noted that the Ontario Law Reform Commission questioned the long tradition of
personal immunity for Crown servants in its Report on the Liability of the Crown.117 One basic
criticism was that the clauses were common but exhibited inconsistency: “there is no rhyme or
reason to the existing pattern of statutory immunity clauses that are currently scattered through
a large number of statutes. There are occasional departures from the more standard form of the
clause and the clause is inexplicably missing altogether from some statutes.”118 The Report also
criticized statutory immunity from a public law perspective:
[T]he present law governing liability of the Crown … is opposed to popular and widely-held
conceptions of government … [T]he government and its officials ought to be subject to the
same legal rules as private individuals … This is a notion that lies at the heart of the “rule of
Law” and of “constitutionalism” … [T]he Crown requires some unique powers and immunities in order to govern effectively ... a long and powerful tradition requires that the scope of
such powers and immunities should be carefully defined, and should be no broader than is
necessary ...119

The Report recommended that all statutory immunity provisions be replaced with an indemnity scheme—whether in statute or in contract—which is the mechanism open to most employers and employees where there is concern of a chilling effect.120

B. The Rejection of Parallel Policy Rationales by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada
While the policy rationale for legislation is typically not the province of the courts, both the
Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized a tort of negligent
investigation by police.121 The key policy arguments opposing a duty of care owed by police to
suspects parallel those opposing liability for government physicians acting in good faith. MoreIbid., vol. 1 at 19.
Goudge Report, supra note 5, vol. 3 at 302-07.
115
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Ibid., vol. 3 at 303-07.
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Ontario, 1989) [OLRC Report] (Not only was Professor Hogg the research director, but three commissioners
are particularly noteworthy: Rosalie S. Abella, now Justice Abella of the S.C.C.; J. Robert S. Prichard, then
Dean of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, and a respected tort scholar; and Earl A. Cherniak, one of
the province‟s leading litigators.).
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over, the roles of government physicians largely parallel those of police. Thus, the Courts‟ rejection of the arguments against a tort of negligent investigation by police provides an excellent
basis for the rejection of arguments for good-faith immunity for government physicians.
In most of their duties and functions, coroners, forensic pathologists, and MOHs are similar
to police. The core duties of the police include investigating possible offences and “laying charges
and participating in prosecutions,” as well as “preventing crimes and other offences” and “assisting victims of crime.” 122 Outside those functions related to coroners‟ inquests, the coronial
system functions as investigative agency, comparable to a police force.123 Recall from above that
coroners investigate unnatural deaths in order to establish “how … when … where … and by what
means the deceased came by his or her death.”124 In doing so, coroners employ entry, search, and
seizure powers.125 The forensic pathologist, in performing any autopsy or other analysis ordered
by a coroner, is an integral part of this investigative apparatus.126 Recall that pathologists often
provide oral reports to the police.127 If the investigation reveals that the death was not due to
natural causes, there is a statutory requirement that the Crown Attorney be informed.128 Crown
Attorneys are explicitly required to consider the information provided by coroners if that
information may relate to criminal (or provincial) offences.129
In a similar manner, MOHs essentially function as the public health police with investigative
and remedial powers. Recall from above that MOHs have a duty to inspect their territory, including places used for food storage or service or as boarding houses, and to investigate complaints
about health hazards.130 They have powers of entry, search, and seizure.131 They exercise broad
remedial powers to rectify health hazards that include ordering a property cleaned, closed, or
vacated, or any thing destroyed.132 Several of the matters that may be discovered in the course of
an investigation constitute offences.133 Where communicable diseases are at issue, MOHs similarly have broad remedial powers that include ordering any property closed or any person to
submit to medical examination or treatment.134
Government physicians, as do the police, investigate offences and promote public safety—
like police, often using extensive coercive powers over persons and property to do so. On this
basis, the decisions in Hill—recognizing a tort of negligent investigation by police—can be
instructively applied to government physicians. I turn now to those decisions.
At the Court of Appeal, the major argument against the duty of care was a “chilling effect” on
police.135 The core of this argument is that civil liability will discourage police from asserting their
powers for fear of litigation. In his rejection of this assertion as “speculative and counterintuitive”, Justice MacPherson explicitly invoked the example of medical professionals:
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[T]here are legal standards that already govern those investigations - for example, the
reasonable and probable grounds standard for making an arrest…. Surgeons do not turn off
the light over the operating room table because they owe a duty of care to their patients.
They perform the operation, with care.136

As police are held to “legal standards” in the absence of tort liability, so too are physicians held
to professional standards enforceable via disciplinary sanctions by the College of Physicians
and Surgeons.137 Thus, it is equivalently speculative that the same civil liability for negligence
that other physicians routinely endure would influence the behaviour of government physicians in a way that professional liability does not. Related to the “chilling effect,” and similarly
rejected by the Court, was the “floodgates” assertion that litigation would unduly occupy the
police.138 While physicians may resent the time and effort spent defending their actions in
court, near-total immunity given the low threshold of good faith is a facile and overbroad
response.
In rejecting these arguments against a duty of care, the Court also recognized the positive
dual role of such a duty, a role that would also apply to liability for government physicians: the
need to balance police powers against the rights of those affected by the police, and the absence
of an “alternative remedy”. 139 The proposition that resort to the College of Physicians and
Surgeons is an adequate response to erroneous harmful acts by government physicians is weakened by the characterization by Justice MacPherson: “the existence of a public complaints
process that might result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions is „no alternative to liability
in negligence.‟”140 Just as the reprimand or suspension of a police officer is no more than moral
vindication for a complainant, so too is regulatory action against a government physician.141
The Court of Appeal held that instead of no liability, the correct response to policy concerns
was “a carefully tailored standard of care”;142 thus, the Court also rejected the additional argument of the adequacy of malicious prosecution as a cause of action.143 A standard of care incorporating “normal professional negligence” would be “not overly onerous” for police.144 As it is the
same standard of care typically applicable to physicians, it would seem similarly appropriate to
government physicians. The normative argument made by Justice MacPherson was straightforward and eloquent:
[a requirement of malice] would set the bar too high … [T]here is another category of police
misconduct that has the potential to cause serious harm to members of the public … [T]he
misconduct is anchored in very poor performance of important police duties. It is important to give some flesh and blood to this non-malicious category of police misconduct …
Should Canadian law not provide a cause of action in negligence to people [harmed by neg-
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ligent police conduct]? Honest reflection about what happened to them suggests only one
answer.145

In affirming this reasoning, Chief Justice McLachlin was more concise: “To deny a remedy in
tort is, quite literally, to deny justice.”146 Justice MacPherson‟s reasoning on malice is similarly
applicable to government physicians. Statutory good-faith immunity leaves the tort of
negligence available only where there is bad faith, be it by malice or serious carelessness or
recklessness.147 There is a whole other “non-malicious category” of misconduct by government
physicians that is not actionable.148 It “has the potential to cause serious harm to members of
the public” just as police negligence does.149
The Court of Appeal recognized key factors that would preclude liability in negligence, but
held that such factors did not apply to police. The Court cited the propositions of the Supreme
Court that a duty of care was less appropriate for policy reasons where the action was “in the nature of governmental or legislative policy-making” (as opposed to “operational”) or “in the performance of a quasi-judicial function.”150 Note that these factors do apply to some of the functions of government physicians. For example, a major and publicly visible role of coroners is to
hold inquests.151 The role of a coroner at an inquest is quasi-judicial, as she essentially sits in
place of a judge.152 Similarly, a widespread quarantine of a whole class of persons could be a policy decision, and the CMOH‟s annual report “on the state of public health in Ontario” is partly of
a policy nature.153 How tort law would apply to these policy or quasi-judicial functions of government physicians will be considered further below.
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While Chief Justice McLachlin for the majority in the Supreme Court largely affirmed the
reasoning of the Court of Appeal, she also addressed Justice Charron‟s dissenting argument that
the proposed duty to suspects was irreconcilable with the established duty to the public.154 The
tension asserted by Justice Charron between these two duties has an equivalent for government
physicians. Just as “it is always in the interest of individual members of society to be left alone
rather than to be investigated by the police,”155 so too is it in that interest not to be considered in
the causation of a suspicious death by a coroner or pathologist, or not to be inspected or quarantined by an MOH. Thus, as Justice Charron held that “the suspect‟s interest is always at odds
with the public interest,”156 so too is it for those who are the target of the coercive powers of the
coroner, pathologist, or MOH. Nonetheless, the “authority to make decisions in the public interest that are adverse to certain citizens” would not be seriously threatened if those physicians
lacked good-faith statutory immunity, any more than if the police were subject to a tort of negligent investigation—only the ability to do so negligently without repercussion would be
removed.157 In this regard, Chief Justice McLachlin explained that the conflict between the interest in being left alone and the duty to the public arose because the wrong pair of elements was
being weighed. The duty to the public “does not conflict with the presumed duty to take reasonable care toward the suspect … the suspect is a member of the public.”158 What was at issue was
not “a duty to leave the citizen alone, but only a duty to investigate reasonably.”159 These comments are prescient to the liability of government physicians, as their duties to the public as a
whole are consistent with, not opposed to, their duties to act without negligence toward particular members of the public.

IV
AFTER GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT PHYSICIANS:
A RETURN TO THE COMMON LAW OF TORT
I have discussed above how statutory good-faith immunity is inconsistent with the requirement that coroners, forensic pathologists, and MOHs be licensed physicians. It is inequitable
that government physicians are held to a legislated standard of care that is lower than that
required of all other physicians by the common law. However, the abolition of this statutory
good-faith immunity would not mean that all harm done by government physicians would lead
to liability in negligence. The equality that would result is the equal application of the common
law of tort, not an equality of outcome. Potentially tortious conduct by government physicians
and other physicians would both be judged according to the evolving common-law principles of
tort. For example, as discussed above the role of a coroner in relations to inquests is a quasijudicial function that would not incur liability in negligence.160 In this section, I discuss how the
law of negligence would apply to government physicians if statutory good-faith immunity were
removed.
In the absence of statutory good-faith immunity, there will nonetheless be no liability where
there is insufficient proximity to the harmed individual. The Ontario Court of Appeal has held
that the high-level prevention of disease and promotion of health is a duty to the public at large
and not to any particular member of the population. However, this does not preclude all tort
liability in the public health sphere.
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156
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Justice Sharpe applied this private duty versus public duty distinction in the West Nile Virus
case of Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health & Long Term Care)161 and in the SARS cases.
In Eliopoulos, a negligence claim against the Ontario government for contracting the virus from
a mosquito bite was struck as disclosing no cause of action.162 Justice Sharpe held that the plaintiffs failed at the first stage of the Anns/Cooper test for a government‟s private duty of care, that
of foreseeabilty and proximity—even if forseeabilty was assumed, there was no proximity.163 The
statute created a public law duty but not a private duty:
[T]hese important and extensive statutory provisions create discretionary powers that are
not capable of creating a private law duty ... They are not aimed at or geared to the protection of the private interests of specific individuals. From the statement of purpose in s. 2
and by implication from the overall scheme of the HPPA, no doubt there is a general public
law duty that requires the Minister to endeavour to promote, safeguard, and protect the
health of Ontario residents and prevent the spread of infectious diseases. However, a general public law duty of that nature does not give rise to a private law duty sufficient to
ground an action in negligence.164

Justice Sharpe also observed that the plaintiffs would have failed at the second stage of the
Anns/Cooper test, i.e. that residual policy considerations made a private duty problematic.165
He emphasized the importance of policy discretion at the macro level and implicitly invoked
chilling-effect concerns:
[T]o impose a private law duty of care … would create an unreasonable and undesirable
burden on Ontario that would interfere with sound decision-making in the realm of public
health. Public health priorities should be based on the general public interest. Public health
authorities should be left to decide where to focus their attention and resources without the
fear or threat of lawsuits.166

Justice Sharpe similarly rejected the claims in the SARS cases.167 In Abarquez he stated:
“[W]hile Ontario is obliged to protect the public at large from the spread of communicable
diseases such as West Nile Virus and SARS, Ontario does not owe ... individual residents of the
province who contract such diseases a private law duty of care giving rise [to] claims for
damages.”168 From these cases, it is clear there is no private duty of care owed by the government
to formulate its policies or determine its priorities so as to prevent the infection of specific
members of the public.

161
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However, this does not preclude liability where government physicians are negligent in their
interactions with specific members of the public. In Williams, Justice Sharpe referred to potential negligence on the part of practicing physicians:
[T]his result does not leave the plaintiff without a remedy if she can show that she suffered
harm as a result of negligence at the operational level on the part of those responsible for
the application and enforcement of the Directives; namely, health care facilities and health
care professionals.169

In a similar manner, the improper exercise of powers of treatment or quarantine, or the failure
to exercise those powers, could constitute negligence by an MOH.170 Similarly, a coroner that
negligently investigates a particular death such that the wrong person is charged or even
convicted—or a pathologist that negligently conducts an autopsy to the same effect—could be
liable to that person.171
Indeed, Justice Sharpe‟s subsequent decision in Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield Ski Club Inc.
confirms that the calculus of negligence changes once a particular individual comes to the attention of the arms of the state.172 Heaslip Estate involved the unavailability of an air ambulance to
transfer a patient, and the allegation that the province failed to follow its policy for air ambulance
allocation.173 The motion judge struck out the claim against the province, applying Eliopolous in
finding only a public duty and not a private duty; likewise, policy considerations, including a
potential “chilling effect”, would have gone against finding a duty.174 Justice Sharpe, in overturning that decision, cited Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health) for the proposition that “once the
government has direct communication or interaction with the individual in the operation or
implementation of a policy, a duty of care may arise, particularly where the safety of the individual is at risk”.175 Thus, an MOH that becomes aware of a specific individual that could require
quarantine, examination, or treatment, and negligently determines which steps are necessary or
negligently enforces those steps, is in an analogous position.
These cases are consistent with the recognition of the Court of Appeal in Hill that policymaking and quasi-judicial functions are generally protected from liability in negligence.176 Highlevel governmental decisions made regarding the general protection of the public against
communicable diseases would likely not create a private duty of care.177 However, that still leaves
negligence applicable to a substantial range of operational performance regarding the exercise of
statutory powers in the case of specific individuals.
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Perell J.‟s decision in Lakeridge, supra note 74, suggests there would be no liability to persons merely
exposed, but not infected, by that negligence.
171
The Ontario C.A. has held that whether common-law witness immunity covers only the testimony of a
pathologist, as opposed to the autopsy and the provision of an oral opinion to the police, must be considered
on the specific facts (Reynolds, supra note 34 at para. 24). Thus, the effect of witness immunity on a negligence claim in the absence of statutory immunity remains to be seen.
172
2009 ONCA 594, 96 O.R. (3d) 401, 252 O.A.C. 1 [Heaslip Estate].
173
Ibid. at para. 17.
174
Ibid. at paras. 13-14.
175
Ibid. at para. 21, citing Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 ONCA 660, 93 O.R. (3d) 35, 300
D.L.R. (4th) 415 at para. 66, leave to appeal refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 491.
176
Hill (C.A.), supra note 1.
177
See Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 689 [Just]. Justice Sharpe cited
Just in Heaslip Estate, supra note 172 at para. 21 for the following: “The duty of care alleged here belongs
within the established category of a public authority‟s negligent failure to act in accordance with an established policy where it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to do so will cause physical harm to the plaintiff”.
169
170

96

MCGILL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH / REVUE DE DROIT ET SANTÉ DE MCGILL

[VOL. 4, NO. 2]

CONCLUSION: AN INEQUITABLE DENIAL OF JUSTICE
Statutory good-faith immunity for coroners, pathologists, and MOHs is ultimately an inequitable denial of justice. The justice provided by tort law should be available to those harmed by
any negligent physician.178 Government physicians are required by statute to hold valid medical
licences. The same statutes grant them extensive investigative and coercive powers and so create
the potential for extensive harm. Nonetheless, they negate the common law competence
standard of care for physicians with a good-faith requirement for civil immunity. This statutory
good-faith immunity is common for government employees, and there is no evidence that its
appropriateness in the special context of government physicians was actively considered during
the legislative process. The reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of
Canada in recognizing a tort of negligent investigation by police suggests that liability in
negligence is appropriate where a government employee exerts investigative and coercive powers
over the individual. In particular, a disciplinary process is no substitute for civil liability, and
speculation regarding a chilling effect should be given little weight. Moreover, there is no conflict
of duties in the exercise of powers over the individual in the interests of the general public—the
public is made up of such individuals.
There are two levels of changes that would address this inequity. At a minimum, governments should remove the distinction between those harmed by MOHs and those harmed by
coroners or forensic pathologists. This would involve amending the immunity provision in the
Coroners Act so that the government remains liable despite the physicians‟ personal immunity.
The next level of action would be to remove good-faith immunity provisions from statutes
governing government physicians. If the government remains concerned about the potential
chilling effect, it could offset it by other means such as those suggested by Commissioner
Goudge—better training, compensation, facilities, or equipment. It could also adopt an
employer-employee indemnity provision as suggested by the OLRC Report—whether in statute
or contract.179
The revocation of statutory good-faith immunity would restore the application of the
common law of tort.180 There would be no liability where there is only a duty to the public at large
(such as in outbreaks of contagious diseases), or in policy or quasi-judicial matters (such as a
coroners‟ inquest). However, the duties and functions directed toward specific individuals—
particularly decisions concerning coercive quarantine, examination or treatment, or involvement
in suspicious deaths—could give rise to liability.
The Naylor Report, the SARS Commission, and the Goudge Report each made valuable
recommendations to reduce or prevent future harm in death investigation and public health. In
their wake, it would be valuable to recognize the state‟s responsibility when such harm nonetheless occurs, by restoring Crown liability for the tortious conduct of coroners and pathologists.
Doing so could indeed improve the quality of death investigation and public health services.
Ending the Crown‟s PACA-created immunity under the Coroners Act would tend to improve the
quality of death investigation, as it would no longer be in the state‟s financial interest to dedicate
insufficient resources to the hiring, training, and supervision of the physicians involved. If the
See supra note 146.
Indeed, McLachlin C.J.C. in Hill, supra note 1 at para. 59 recognized that such indemnity was common
in the police context and would reduce the impact of any chilling effect: “[M]any police officers (like other
professionals) are indemnified from personal civil liability in the course of exercising their professional
duties, reducing the prospect that their fear of civil liability will chill crime prevention.” See e.g. Police Services Act, supra note 122, s. 50. Also see OLRC Report, supra note 117.
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To keep statutory immunity but add a further element of “reasonable grounds” or “gross negligence”
would be a weak reform. Such standards may be appropriate when the government is imposing requirements
on all physicians regardless of their expertise, but not where the government is hiring and empowering its
own physicians on the basis of such expertise.
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government went further and abolished good-faith immunity for government physicians, tort
liability might play the same quality-enhancing role it does in health care.
In closing, it must be noted that there is nothing forcing the government to act. Statutory
good-faith immunity provisions are certainly not unlawful. The majority of the Supreme Court
held in 1994 that the legislative choice to limit Crown liability was to be addressed, if at all, at the
ballot box: “If the Crown wishes to exempt itself from tortious liability … it is a simple matter to
legislate to that effect, and to leave the propriety of that legislative action for the voters‟
consideration.”181 The core arguments for change are based on justice and equity. I adopt the
observation of the OLRC Report—“the answer to the question why the government should
relinquish many of the advantages that it now enjoys is very simple, yet compelling. It is the right
and fair thing for good government to do.”182

181
Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445 at 461, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 18, Cory J.
(Note that McLachlin J. [as she then was] did not sign on to the majority judgment, but instead wrote a short
concurring opinion at 449-50. It is difficult to infer from her reasons whether she agreed with the quoted
statement of Cory J. at that time.). An extended version of this passage is quoted in Horsman & Morley, supra
note 23 at 5.50.10.
182
Supra note 117 at 6.

